

Dr. Blair Reich
% 227 Cherry Street
Columbia, PA 17512
blairjesseellynreich@gmail.com
979-574-1577
blackcollarcartel.com
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Memorandum of Law on the Application of the Federal Supremacy Clause and Constitutional Due Process Protections and Prohibitions in Legal Proceedings Generally and as Specifically Applied to Title IVD and Family Law Matters

Table of Authorities

United States Constitution

- U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
- U.S. Const. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause).
- U.S. Const. amend. V (Due Process Clause, Takings Clause).
- U.S. Const. amend. XIV (Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause).
- U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause).
- U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (Federal judicial power over controversies).
- U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (Oaths for state officials binding to federal law).
- U.S. Const. art. II, cl. 1 (Oath for federal officials).
- U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (No state shall impair obligations of contracts).

Federal Statutes

- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Freedom of Information Act).
- 5 U.S.C. § 557 (Formal administrative hearings requirements).
- 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Scope of review under Administrative Procedure Act).
- 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Consumer Credit Protection Act, garnishment limits).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (Treason).
- 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (Seditious conspiracy).
- 28 U.S.C. § 453 (Judicial oath of office).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal question jurisdiction).

- 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (Removal of civil actions to federal court).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (Priority determination for civil rights cases).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Anti-Injunction Act exceptions for federal rights).
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act).
- 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Title IV-D enforcement mechanisms).
- 42 U.S.C. § 659a (International child support enforcement under supremacy).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil rights actions for deprivation of rights).

Federal Regulations

- 28 C.F.R. § 0.50 (Civil Rights Division authority).
- 45 C.F.R. § 302.34 (Cooperative agreements for child support enforcement).
- 45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307 (Title IV-D program requirements).

Cases

- *Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (Preemption in federal-state conflicts).
- *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (Enforceability of Title IV-D rights).
- *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Habeas for due process in admin detention).
- *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (Burden-shifting in summary judgment for un rebutted facts).
- *Clafin v. Houseman*, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (State enforcement of federal rights).
- *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (State officials bound by federal supremacy).
- *Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (Federal preemption of state law).
- *Employment Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause scrutiny).
- *FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc.*, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Supremacy in administrative contexts).
- *Felder v. Casey*, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (State notice-of-claim statutes preempted by §1983).
- *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (Supremacy origins).
- *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Procedural due process requirements).
- *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Qualified immunity standards).
- *Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (No state bar on federal claims).
- *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (States can't immunize §1983 violations).
- *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Due process balancing test).
- *McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco*, 496 U.S. 18 (1990) (Remedies for federal violations by states).
- *Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (§1983 as exception to anti-injunction act).
- *Murphy v. NCAA*, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) (Anti-commandeering doctrine).
- *Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Dissenting opinion on liberty continuum).
- *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Parental rights and state interests).
- *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (States must not obstruct federal law).
- *Pulliam v. Allen*, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (Limits on judicial immunity for injunctive relief).

- Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Lower courts bound by SCOTUS precedents; Gorsuch opinion).
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Burden of proof in parental rights cases).
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Fundamental parental rights).
- Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (1795) (Property rights).
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Strict scrutiny for fundamental liberties).

Court Rules

- Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (General rules of pleading).
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (Waiver of defenses if not raised).
- Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Summary judgment for unrebutted facts).
- Fed. R. Evid. 201 (Judicial notice of facts requiring rebuttal).
- Fed. R. Evid. 301 (Presumptions in civil cases generally).
- Fed. R. Evid. 302 (Applying state law to presumptions in civil cases).
- Fed. R. Evid. 602 (Need for personal knowledge).

Other Authorities

- Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-308 (Reservation of rights; where commercial presumptions apply in contractual contexts).

Synopsis

State and federal courts and agencies must adhere to federal supremacy in all proceedings, ensuring due process, equal protection, and safeguards for fundamental liberties, or risk ultra vires civil rights violation, crime commission, and all manner of unpleasant remedies. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Executive Summary

The Supremacy Clause requires state and federal entities to prioritize federal law over conflicting state actions or agreements. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Supremacy nullifies state laws conflicting with federal authority, as in commerce but extending to Title IV-D (Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). Without wiggle room for non-rebuttal.

Judicial oaths and Supreme Court precedents bind lower courts to this principle without exception. (28 U.S.C. § 453; Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020)). In legal proceedings, deprivations of fundamental fairness, due process, or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment are impermissible, and abridgments of liberties such as parental, religious, and/or

property rights demand strict scrutiny and thus require judicial action of the “least restrictive means,” “narrowly tailored,” and of a “compelling state interest,” which is not specifically defined but is “of the highest order.” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).

Systemic non-compliance through procedural omissions or incentives may violate federal mandates, supporting claims under Section 1983. (18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. § 1983). State Plans and Cooperative Agreements affirm federal supremacy but can create misaligned incentives. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34). Entities must ensure neutral adjudication, statutory adherence, notice, hearings, and procedural protections like burdens of proof and presumptions. (*Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).

Prohibited conduct includes overreach, unconstitutional conditions, takings, retaliation, vagueness, state created danger, and deliberate indifference. (U.S. Const. amend. V; *Employment Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Omissions mask violations, necessitating remedies such as appeals or removal to federal court. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1441). This framework applies across vertical legal jurisdictions and horizontal physical geographies to enforce constitutional compliance.

Biblical Preamble: Moral Imperative for Disclosure and Justice

In the name of Yeshua, who came to seek and save the lost (Luke 19:10), I address you serpents and scorpions under divine authority: "Behold, I give unto you power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall by any means hurt me" (Luke 10:19). You pervert justice like Pharaoh's taskmasters (Exodus 5:6-9), oppress the fatherless (Exodus 22:22-23), and pervert judgment (Deuteronomy 24:17). Proverbs 31:8-9 commands: "Open thy mouth for the dumb in the cause of all such as are appointed to destruction. Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and needy." Your silence mocks this, conspiring against the innocent (Psalm 82:3-4).

Introduction: Systemic Insurrection against Federal Supremacy in Title IV-D Related Family Law Matters and Resultant High Crimes by Elected and Appointed Government Officials?

This memorandum addresses systemic non-compliance with federal supremacy and constitutional safeguards in legal proceedings, including family law and related administrative actions. It alleges that certain elected and appointed officials in federal and state governments, in collaboration with judicial and agency personnel, engage in coordinated deprivations of constitutional rights to maximize federal incentives, such as Title IV-D funding. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.). These actions, described herein as an alleged "Black Collar Cartel," involve intentional violations of the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, regulations, and court rules, as well as parallel state provisions. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 453).

Such conduct depends on procedural omissions that deprive litigants—particularly fathers in family law matters—of due process, equal protection, and fundamental liberties, while issuing orders that appear statutorily compliant but lack constitutional footings. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); *Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance*, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)). State officials, including judges and agency personnel, must take oaths to support the U.S. Constitution, binding them to federal supremacy in all capacities, with violations constituting perjury up to sedition (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3; 18 U.S.C. § 2384). This mandates point-by-point rebuttal of supremacy claims or results in acceptance and acquiescence.

The scheme relies on obscured interstate and intrastate agreements that affirm federal supremacy on paper but incentivize non-compliance through financial rewards for high collections and low arrears, without benefits for constitutional adherence. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34; 45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307). Judicial resistance to pro se litigant supremacy challenges, including gaslighting litigants as "sovereign citizens" or deeming arguments frivolous, further entrenches the issues. (Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983). State officials' oaths to support the Constitution bind them to supremacy, making evasion perjury and requiring rebuttal or compliance (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3).

Fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment requires a continuum of protections against arbitrary deprivations, with heightened scrutiny for core liberties like justice, parental rights, and property interests. (*Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dissenting opinion); *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). State interference demands a compelling interest, which funding maximization does not satisfy. (*Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Under *Quilloin v. Walcott* the State Interest when considering fit parents is presumed "di minimus" and a compelling state interest is a high impossibility of law.

The result is coordinated actions at the local, state, and Federal level that consistently, repeatedly, and predictably evade Federal Supremacy. The issued orders are void ab initio and intentionally lack constitutional basis while appearing to meet statutory standards. The motive is to fleece fathers of support money and launder interstate funding from Title IVD. The system is compromised from top to bottom, judicial boots on the ground are effectuating a human trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering operation and the method of depriving fathers of constitutional rights and liberties are heinous high crimes of treason and sedition supported by a laundry list of felonies like wire fraud and mail fraud.

The DOs and DON'Ts of Federal Supremacy

This memorandum outlines the "DOs" (required protections of litigants) and "DON'Ts" (prohibited judicial actions) of federal supremacy, applicable across proceedings, and with the primary purpose to demand compliance under Federal Supremacy of the instant court regarding the instant matter or point-by-point rebuttal refuting why the instant court and instant matter somehow are unaccountable to Federal Supremacy, Federal Law, Federal Mandates, and Federal Urgency.

Federal law preempts state regulations that conflict with or obstruct federal objectives, as in immigration but applicable to Title IV-D where state family law undermines federal supremacy in child support enforcement (*Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)). State actors must yield, or their actions are void. Federal judicial power extends to controversies involving federal questions, empowering courts to enforce supremacy over state actions in Title IV-D disputes (U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). This ensures federal review of state non-compliance. While the domestic relations exception limits federal jurisdiction over pure state family matters (*Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)), it does not apply to federal questions like Title IV-D preemption or constitutional violations / Civil Rights; federal law expressly preempts state family law where it frustrates federal objectives, as in support enforcement (*Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo*, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.). Implied preemption exists under field and conflict doctrines, voiding state procedures that obstruct due process (*Arizona v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).

Treatment of Pro Se Litigants Under Federal Supremacy

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal attorney filings, ensuring arguments on federal supremacy are not dismissed for technical deficiencies (*Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). This mandates courts address substance over form, rebutting points rather than evading or issuing constructive denials for record requests under FOIA/Public Record Request laws or court motions without hearings on the merits. Courts must read pro se complaints indulgently, inferring viable claims under federal law like supremacy violations, and requiring rebuttal instead of summary rejection (*Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). Failure to do so violates due process. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (state oaths); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (supremacy origins); *Clafin v. Houseman*, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (state enforcement of federal rights); *Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (no state bar on federal claims); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (admission by failure to deny).

Multi-Level Contractual and Constitutional Obligations Under Federal Supremacy in Title IV-D Programs

The Title IV-D child support enforcement program, established under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), operates as a federal-state interstate partnership that imposes mandatory compliance with federal law at every level of administration. This structure ensures that federal supremacy—rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2)—is not optional but obligatory for federal agencies, states, counties, courts, and local entities, agencies, and instrumentalities. Through state plans and cooperative agreements (or equivalent local arrangements in other states), participants affirm their subordination to federal requirements, creating binding contractual obligations that reinforce constitutional mandates. Failure to comply risks loss of federal funding, which typically covers approximately 66% of program costs. This section examines these obligations, drawing on language from Pennsylvania's state plan and cooperative agreement as illustrative examples, supported by federal statutes and regulations.

Federal officials' presidential oath extends to all executive agents, requiring fidelity to supremacy; non-compliance in Title IV-D administration triggers mandamus or §1983 remedies (U.S. Const. art. II, cl. 1; 5 U.S.C. § 706).

State courts and administrative bodies must enforce federal law under the Supremacy Clause, with no discretion to refuse jurisdiction over federal claims (*Testa v. Katt*, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)). This obligation extends to family law and Title IV-D matters, requiring judicial agents to apply federal standards like due process and preemption over conflicting state rules. States must enforce federal rights in their courts, with no discretion to ignore supremacy claims without rebuttal (*Claflin v. Houseman*, 93 U.S. 130 (1876)).

Treaties like the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support (ratified by the U.S. in 2017) are supreme law under the Supremacy Clause, preempting inconsistent state family law actions and requiring uniform enforcement in Title IV-D matters (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 42 U.S.C. § 659a) or fail equal protection.

States and their officials are potentially shielded from being compelled to enforce federal law but they are universally prohibited from obstructing it, as in gun background checks; applied here, state family courts must not hinder federal supremacy in Title IV-D by evading due process (*Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)). However; States cannot bar federal claims like §1983 in their courts should state actors refuse to abide by Federal Supremacy, requiring full rebuttal of supremacy arguments (*Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729 (2009)).

Accountability and Immunity Under Federal Supremacy

Judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief or attorney fees against judges for violations of federal rights in their official capacity, allowing litigants to enjoin ongoing supremacy breaches in family law or administrative proceedings (*Pulliam v. Allen*, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)). This ensures accountability for non-compliant state actors without piercing absolute immunity for damages.

Government officials lose qualified immunity when they violate clearly established federal rights, such as due process under supremacy in Title IV-D matters, exposing them to personal liability under §1983 if a reasonable official would know the conduct was unlawful (*Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). This is especially true if extensive notice is provided to said state officer. This deters deliberate non-compliance by state actors in judicial or administrative roles.

Federal courts can compel unlawfully withheld or delayed agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, including mandamus to enforce federal supremacy in state-administered programs like Title IV-D where delays violate due process (5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). This remedy forces non-compliant agencies to act promptly on records requests or hearings. Section 1983 serves as an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, allowing federal courts to enjoin state proceedings violating supremacy, requiring state actors to rebut or cease (*Mitchum v. Foster*, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)).

States violating federal law must provide meaningful post-deprivation remedies, such as refunds for unconstitutionally collected funds in Title IV-D support orders, to comply with due process; failure to do so entitles litigants to restitution or equitable relief (*McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco*, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)). State notice-of-claim requirements are preempted by §1983, ensuring direct federal enforcement of supremacy without procedural barriers; un rebutted claims stand (*Felder v. Casey*, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)).

The DOJ Civil Rights Division investigates supremacy violations in state programs like Title IV-D, compelling rebuttals or facing federal enforcement actions (28 C.F.R. § 0.50). Silence estops defenses.

Federal Supremacy in Title IV-D State Plans

As a prerequisite for receiving federal funds, each state must submit a State Plan for approval by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Child Support Services (OCSS). This plan explicitly affirms federal supremacy by requiring the state to administer the program in accordance with federal laws and regulations. In Pennsylvania's **state plan**, the cover page states:

As a condition to the receipt of Federal funds under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the PA DHS OIM-Bureau of Children (name of single & separate IV-D agency) submits herewith the State plan for the program of support collection and establishment of paternity under title IV-D of the Act and hereby agrees to administer the program in accordance with the provisions of this State Plan, the Act, and all applicable Federal Laws, regulations and other official issuances of the Department. The official text of said laws, regulations, and official issuances govern and the State agency acknowledges its responsibility to adhere to them.

This language subordinates state administration to federal authority, emphasizing that federal texts "govern" over any conflicting state provisions. It is mandated by §454(18) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §654(18)), which requires state plans to include assurances of compliance with federal requirements, and 45 CFR 302.60, which conditions funding on adherence to federal standards. Section 1.2 of Pennsylvania's plan further reinforces statewide uniformity:

"This plan is in effect in all political subdivisions of the State in accordance with equitable standards for the administration that are mandatory throughout the State,"

citing §454(1) of the Act and 45 CFR 302.10. This ensures that counties and local courts cannot opt out, as the plan is "mandatory on such political subdivisions."

This templated affirmation is uniform across all states and jurisdictions participating in Title IV-D, as OCSS provides a standardized preprint format for state plans. For instance, California's state plan includes identical compliance language, affirming administration "in accordance with the

Act and all applicable Federal laws and regulations," pursuant to the same federal mandates. The Supremacy Clause constitutionally obligates states to this framework, as Title IV-D is a conditional spending program where federal law preempts inconsistent state actions (see, e.g., *South Dakota v. Dole*, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).

Federal Supremacy in Intrastate Cooperative Agreements (or state equivalent names for Cooperative Agreements like Intergovernmental Agency Agreements)

At the local level, states must enter into cooperative agreements with courts, counties, and other entities to delegate Title IV-D functions, such as paternity establishment and support enforcement. These agreements explicitly bind local participants to federal supremacy. In Pennsylvania's cooperative agreement with Beaver County (or equivalent agreements in other counties), Section 9, titled **AFFIRMATION OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY** provides:

All parties affirm that they shall comply with the requirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, implementing Federal regulations, and any other applicable Federal requirements and standards.

This clause ensures that local Domestic Relations Sections (DRS), courts, and county commissioners adhere to federal law, preventing any deviation. The agreement's purpose in Section 1.1 ties directly to federal efficiency standards: "The purpose of this agreement is to administer and optimize the effectiveness and performance of the Title IV-D Child Support Enforcement Program in accordance with Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR) 305.33, and to ensure the securing of financial and medical support for minor children... as required by 45 CFR 303.20(c)."

These provisions are required by 45 CFR 302.34, which mandates that state plans include written cooperative agreements with courts and law enforcement, specifying that "the parties will comply with title IV-D of the Act, implementing Federal regulations and any other applicable Federal regulations and requirements." This stems from §454(7) and §454(20) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §654(7), (20)), which require states to ensure local cooperation and compliance. In Pennsylvania, this is further supported by state law, such as 23 Pa.C.S. § 4301 et seq. (or equivalent statutes outside of Pennsylvania, such as Cal. Fam. Code § 17300 et seq. in California), which aligns local operations with the federally approved State Plan.

Equivalents in other states, such as California's "Plan of Cooperation" with local child support agencies or Michigan's interagency agreements, contain similar affirmations of federal compliance. For example, California's agreements require local agencies to "comply with all applicable federal and state laws, regulations, and policies," mirroring 45 CFR 302.34. These contractual obligations bind local entities constitutionally under the Supremacy Clause, as federal funding conditions preempt local discretion (see, e.g., *Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)).

Binding Obligations Across Vertical Levels of Government

The interplay of State Plans and Cooperative Agreements creates a cascading framework of obligations: Federal agencies (e.g., OCSS) enforce compliance through plan approval and audits; states bind themselves and their subdivisions via plans; and counties/courts affirm adherence in agreements. This multi-level structure ensures federal supremacy is mandatory, not optional, with penalties including funding withholding under 45 CFR 301.13. Constitutionally, all levels must prioritize federal law, preventing any entity from treating Title IV-D requirements or Federal Laws, Mandates, and/or Urgency as elective. This uniformity promotes program efficacy nationwide, as evidenced by similar systems in states like California and Michigan.

Extension to Individual Employees and Officials Under Federal Supremacy

The binding nature of federal supremacy in the Title IV-D program extends beyond institutional entities to individual government employees and officials at all levels—federal agencies, states, state agencies, counties, county courts, and Domestic Relations Sections (DRS). This personal accountability ensures that no participant in the program can treat federal requirements as optional, as individuals are held responsible through longstanding constitutional principles, oaths of office, and contractual obligations. No exemptions exist for these individuals in terms of their duty to uphold federal law; while doctrines like qualified immunity may shield them from personal liability in certain civil suits for good-faith actions (see, e.g., *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)), such protections do not relieve them of their foundational obligations to comply with the Supremacy Clause and applicable federal statutes. Exemptions, if any, would only arise in narrow contexts unrelated to Title IV-D, such as absolute immunity for judges in judicial acts (*Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)) or prosecutors in prosecutorial functions (*Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)), but these cases do not permit defiance of federal supremacy in program administration or allow commission of crimes (*United States v. Dugan*, No. 2:25-cr-00089 (E.D. Wis. filed May 13, 2025)).

Counter litigants or private parties who conspire with state officials to deprive rights under color of law can be treated as state actors and held liable under §1983 (*Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144 (1970)). In family law disputes, this applies to those colluding with courts or agencies to enforce unconstitutional orders, reinforcing that all participants must adhere to federal supremacy.

Historical Case Law Establishing Individual Responsibility

The principle that individual government agents are personally responsible for upholding federal law under the Supremacy Clause dates back to the mid-19th century. In *Ableman v. Booth*, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically affirmed that state officials, including judges and law enforcement, are bound by federal law and cannot interfere with its enforcement. The case involved a Wisconsin state court's attempt to release a federal prisoner arrested under the federal Fugitive Slave Act via habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court deemed an improper assertion of state supremacy over federal authority. Chief Justice Roger Taney, writing for a unanimous Court, stressed the Supremacy Clause's direct application to individuals: "judges in every State shall be bound" by federal law, and the Supreme Court is the

ultimate arbiter. Taney reasoned that allowing state officials to disregard federal rulings would lead to chaos, as the federal government must operate uniformly across states. This holding established that individual state agents cannot claim exemption from federal obligations, reinforcing that personal actions in official roles must align with superior federal law. While *Ableman* predates Title IV-D, its principle applies analogously, as federal funding conditions (like those in 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.) preempt conflicting state actions by officials.

This accountability echoes precedents, such as *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), where the Court held that states (and their agents) cannot impede federal operations, like taxing federal bank officials. Later cases built on this, including *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which allows suits against state officials in their individual capacity for ongoing violations of federal law, effectively stripping them of official immunity when they act contrary to the Constitution. In the Title IV-D context, these cases mean that employees enforcing child support under State Plans or Cooperative Agreements cannot invoke state or local discretion to evade federal requirements, such as those in 45 CFR Parts 302 and 303.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individual judicial agents and government officials can be held personally liable for violations of federal rights under color of state law, including deprivations of due process in family law or administrative contexts. Municipal entities face liability for policies or customs causing such violations (*Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). State officials may be sued in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to enforce federal supremacy, bypassing sovereign immunity (*Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

Oaths and Contracts Requiring Constitutional Adherence

Individual obligations are further cemented by oaths of office and employment contracts, which mandate fidelity to the U.S. Constitution, including the Supremacy Clause. For federal employees, 5 U.S.C. § 3331 requires an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic" and to "well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office." This binds OCSS staff and other federal agents administering Title IV-D. State and local officials, including those in Pennsylvania's DHS, county DRS, and courts, take similar oaths. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article VI, § 3 (or equivalent provisions outside Pennsylvania, such as Cal. Const. art. XX, § 3), public officers swear to "support, obey and defend" the U.S. Constitution and state constitution, with federal law prevailing in conflicts. Judges take additional oaths under 28 U.S.C. § 453 (federal) or state equivalents, pledging to "faithfully and impartially discharge" duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Employment contracts and job descriptions in Title IV-D programs incorporate these oaths by reference, often explicitly requiring compliance with federal regulations. For instance, in Pennsylvania's cooperative agreements (e.g., Beaver County's), Section 2.1 mandates that DRS staff "provide adequate staff to perform all duties and responsibilities," tying individual performance to federal standards under 45 CFR 303.20(c). The state plan's Section 1.1, Attachment 1.1A, describes "the kind and numbers of staff assigned to carry out the functions of the IV-D agency," implying personal accountability under the plan's federal compliance affirmation (citing §454(3) of the Social Security Act and 45 CFR 302.12). Violating these could

result in personal repercussions, such as disciplinary action or, in bad faith cases, civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving rights under color of state law.

In summary, from federal OCSS employees to county DRS clerks and state court judges, no individual in the Title IV-D chain is exempt from federal supremacy. Their oaths, contracts, and the historical mandate from cases like *Ableman v. Booth* ensure personal responsibility, aligning with the program's multi-level framework to prevent any opt-out at the operational level.

State-Specific Affirmations of Federal Supremacy in Administrative Matters

Overall: Administrative agencies must afford due process and fundamental fairness, bound by federal supremacy even in non-judicial roles (*Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n*, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)). This applies to courts and to administrative appeals of records requests such as OOR, AG offices, and DRS hearings, prohibiting blanket denials of constitutional rights.

Alabama: Constitution Art. XVI, § 279 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); Code § 41-22-1 et seq. (Alabama Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 420-1-1-.01 et seq. (admin rules mandating impartiality per federal standards); *Ex parte State Bd. of Educ.*, 810 So. 2d 773 (Ala. 2001) (federal supremacy preempts in admin hearings); Rule 41-22-12 (admin hearing rules aligned with federal due process); UCC § 7-1-103 (federal conformity in commercial admin matters).

Alaska: Constitution Art. XII, § 5 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); AS § 44.62.010 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 2 AAC 64.010 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality per federal law); *State v. Weidner*, 684 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1984) (federal supremacy applies in state admin proceedings); Rule 44.62.280 (admin rules referencing federal standards); UCC § 45.01.103 (federal alignment in admin contexts).

Arizona: Constitution Art. II, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); A.R.S. § 41-1001 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. R2-19-101 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartial hearings per federal norms); *Hobson v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.*, 199 Ariz. 525 (Ct. App. 2001) (federal law preempts in admin matters); Rule 41-1092.01 (admin rules tied to federal due process); UCC § 47-1103 (federal conformity in commercial admin).

Arkansas: Constitution Art. XIX, § 20 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); A.C.A. § 25-15-201 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 054.00.1-1 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal-compliant neutrality); *Neal v. Hollingsworth*, 338 Ark. 251 (1999) (federal supremacy in state admin hearings); Rule 25-15-213 (admin rules referencing federal law); UCC § 4-1-103 (federal alignment).

California: Constitution Art. XX, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); Gov't Code § 11340 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. Tit. 1, § 1000 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality per federal standards); *Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co.*, 20 Cal. 4th 785 (1999) (federal supremacy applies in admin proceedings); Rule Gov't Code § 11500 (admin hearing rules aligned with federal); UCC § 1103 (federal conformity).

Colorado: Constitution Art. XII, § 8 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); C.R.S. § 24-4-101 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 CCR 104-1 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal due process); *People v. Guenther*, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987) (federal supremacy in admin hearings); Rule 24-4-105 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 4-1-103 (federal alignment).

Connecticut: Constitution Art. XI, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); C.G.S. § 4-166 et seq. (Uniform Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. § 4-166-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality per federal law); *Hybrid Equip. Co. v. Comm'r of Env'tl. Prot.*, 218 Conn. 265 (1991) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 4-177 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 42a-1-103 (federal conformity).

Delaware: Constitution Art. XIV, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 29 Del. C. § 10101 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 101 Reg. 1 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Wilson*, 504 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1985) (federal supremacy in admin proceedings); Rule 101 Reg. 9 (admin hearing rules aligned); UCC § 1-103 (federal references).

District of Columbia: Organic Act § 16 (acknowledging U.S. Constitution supremacy); D.C. Code § 2-501 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 DCMR 2800 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Timus v. D.C. Dep't of Human Rights*, 633 A.2d 751 (D.C. 1993) (federal supremacy in admin hearings); Rule 2-509 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 28:1-103 (federal conformity).

Florida: Constitution Art. II, § 5 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); F.S. § 120.51 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 28-106.101 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *McDonald v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg.*, 582 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 28-106.213 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 671.103 (federal alignment).

Georgia: Constitution Art. I, § II, Para. V (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 616-1-1-.01 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *Dep't of Transp. v. Del-Cook Timber Co.*, 248 Ga. 734 (1982) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 50-13-13 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 11-1-103 (federal conformity).

Hawaii: Constitution Art. XVI, § 4 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); H.R.S. § 91-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. § 3-1-1 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *In re Doe*, 107 Haw. 12 (2005) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 91-9 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 490:1-103 (federal references).

Idaho: Constitution Art. XVIII, § 6 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); I.C. § 67-5201 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. IDAPA 04.11.01 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *Lockhart v. Dep't of Fish & Game*, 121 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 1991) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 67-5201 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 28-1-103 (federal conformity).

Illinois: Constitution Art. XIII, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 Ill. Adm. Code 100.10 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *Abrahamson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Reg.*, 153 Ill. 2d 76 (1992) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 100.50 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 5/1-103 (federal alignment).

Indiana: Constitution Art. XV, § 4 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); I.C. § 4-21.5-1-1 et seq. (Administrative Orders and Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 45 IAC 1-1-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Austin v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Sheriff Merit Comm'n*, 761 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 4-21.5-3-1 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 26-1-1-103 (federal conformity).

Iowa: Constitution Art. IX, § 22 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); I.C.A. § 17A.1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 481-10.1 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm'n*, 774 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 2009) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 17A.10 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 554.1103 (federal references).

Kansas: Constitution Art. XV, § 15 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); K.S.A. § 77-501 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1-1-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *Moser v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue*, 289 Kan. 513 (2009) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 77-511 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 84-1-103 (federal conformity).

Kentucky: Constitution § 228 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); K.R.S. § 13B.010 et seq. (Administrative Hearings Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 101 KAR 1:010 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *Bd. of Comm'rs v. Vandegrift Constr. Co.*, 319 S.W.3d 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 13B.080 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 355.1-103 (federal alignment).

Louisiana: Constitution Art. X, § 30 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.S. 49:950 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. LAC 1:1.101 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 49:955 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 10.1-103 (federal references).

Maine: Constitution Art. IX, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 5 M.R.S. § 8001 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 01-001 CMR ch. 1 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *Mather v. Comm'r of Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife*, 2000 ME 38 (2000) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 8002 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 1-103 (federal conformity).

Maryland: Constitution Declaration of Rights Art. 2 (U.S. Constitution as supreme law); Md. Code, State Gov't § 10-201 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. COMAR 01.01.1988.11 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Plan. Comm'n v. Anderson*, 395 Md. 172 (2006) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule State Gov't § 10-205 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 1-103 (federal alignment).

Massachusetts: Constitution Pt. 2, Ch. VI, Art. I (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); M.G.L. ch. 30A, § 1 et seq. (State Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 801 CMR 1.00 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *Arthaud v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co.*, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule ch. 30A, § 10 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 1-103 (federal conformity).

Michigan: Constitution Art. XI, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); M.C.L. § 24.201 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. R 28.14201 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *Hanson v. Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm'rs*, 465 Mich. 492 (2001) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 24.271 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 440.1103 (federal references).

Minnesota: Constitution Art. XIII, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); M.S. § 14.001 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. Minn. R. 1400.5100 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *In re Welfare of J.J.P.*, 831 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 2013) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 14.50 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 336.1-103 (federal conformity).

Mississippi: Constitution Art. XIV, § 268 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); Miss. Code § 25-43-1.101 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1.1.1 A et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *Miss. Dep't of Human Servs. v. S.C.*, 119 So. 3d 1011 (Miss. 2013) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 25-43-2.104 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 75-1-103 (federal alignment).

Missouri: Constitution Art. VII, § 11 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.S.Mo. § 536.010 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 CSR 15-3.200 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *Backer v. State*, 85 S.W.3d 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 536.070 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 400.1-103 (federal conformity).

Montana: Constitution Art. III, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); M.C.A. § 2-4-101 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. ARM 1.3.101 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Buechner v. Camelback Ranch, LLC*, 361 Mont. 330 (2006) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 2-4-201 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 30-1-103 (federal references).

Nebraska: Constitution Art. XV, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.R.S. Neb. § 84-901 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 53 NAC 4-001 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *Middle Niobrara Nat. Res. Dist. v. Dep't of Nat. Res.*, 281 Neb. 634 (2011) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 84-909 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 1-103 (federal conformity).

Nevada: Constitution Art. XV, § 2 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); N.R.S. § 233B.010 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. NAC 233B.010 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 129 Nev. 492 (2013) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 233B.040 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 104.0103 (federal alignment).

New Hampshire: Constitution Pt. 2, Art. 84 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.S.A. § 541-A:1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. Jus 800.01 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *Petition of Bagley*, 128 N.H. 275 (1986) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 541-A:30 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 382-A:1-103 (federal conformity).

New Jersey: Constitution Art. XI, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); N.J.S.A. § 52:14B-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth.*, 137 N.J. 8 (1994) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 52:14B-9 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 12A:1-103 (federal references).

New Mexico: Constitution Art. XX, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); N.M.S.A. § 12-8-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1.1.1 NMAC et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *State ex rel. Stratton v. Gurley Motor Co.*, 105 N.M. 803 (Ct. App. 1987) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 12-8-3 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 55-1-103 (federal conformity).

New York: Constitution Art. XIII, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); McKinney's State Admin. Proc. Act § 100 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 18 NYCRR 358.1 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Matter of Miller v. DeBuono*, 90 N.Y.2d 783 (1997) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule State Admin. Proc. Act § 301 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 1-103 (federal alignment).

North Carolina: Constitution Art. VI, § 7 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); G.S. § 150B-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 26 NCAC 03 .0101 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *N.C. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. N.C. Dep't of Agric.*, 216 N.C. App. 121 (2011) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 150B-23 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 25-1-103 (federal conformity).

North Dakota: Constitution Art. XI, § 4 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01 et seq. (Administrative Agencies Practice Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. N.D. Admin. Code 75-01-01-01 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *Reliance Ins. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n*, 250 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1977) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 28-32-21 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 41-01-03 (federal references).

Ohio: Constitution Art. XV, § 7 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.C. § 119.01 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. O.A.C. 123:1-1-01 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant*, 93 Ohio St. 1 (1915) (federal supremacy in admin matters); Rule 119.09 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 1301.103 (federal conformity).

Oklahoma: Constitution Art. XV, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 75 O.S. § 250 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. O.A.C. 1:2001-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *Allen v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Okla. Unif. Ret. Sys. for Justices & Judges*, 769 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1988) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 75:310:1-1-1 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 1-103 (federal alignment).

Oregon: Constitution Art. XV, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); O.R.S. § 183.310 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. O.A.R. 137-003-0000 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); Ward v. Ore. State Bd. of Nursing, 165 Or. App. 650 (2000) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 183.450 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 71.1030 (federal conformity).

Pennsylvania: Constitution Art. VI, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 2 Pa.C.S. § 501 et seq. (Administrative Agency Law incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 Pa. Code § 31.1 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); Lyness v. State Bd. of Med., 529 Pa. 535 (1992) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 35.185 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 1103 (federal references).

Rhode Island: Constitution Art. III, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); G.L. § 42-35-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 280-RICR-20-00-1 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); Champlin's Realty Assocs. v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427 (R.I. 2010) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 42-35-8 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 6A-1-103 (federal conformity).

South Carolina: Constitution Art. VI, § 5 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); S.C. Code § 1-23-310 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 61-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452 (2006) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 1-23-380 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 36-1-103 (federal alignment).

South Dakota: Constitution Art. XXI, § 3 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); S.D.C.L. § 1-26-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. ARSD 20:01:01:01 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); Application of Koch Expl. Co., 387 N.W.2d 530 (S.D. 1986) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 1-26-18 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 57A-1-103 (federal references).

Tennessee: Constitution Art. X, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); T.C.A. § 4-5-101 et seq. (Uniform Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1360-04-01-.01 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 4-5-301 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 47-1-103 (federal conformity).

Texas: Constitution Art. XVI, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); V.T.C.A., Gov't Code § 2001.001 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1 TAC § 155.1 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule Gov't Code § 2001.051 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 1.103 (federal alignment).

Utah: Constitution Art. III, Ord. I (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); U.C.A. § 63G-4-101 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. R15-1-1 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); Hughes v. Bd. of Exam'rs, 75 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 63G-4-201 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 70A-1a-103 (federal references).

Vermont: Constitution Ch. II, § 56 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); 3 V.S.A. § 800 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. Code Vt. Rules 04 030 001 et seq. (admin regs requiring neutrality); *Noble v. Office of Child Support*, 168 Vt. 349 (1998) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 3 V.S.A. § 809 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 9A-1-103 (federal conformity).

Virginia: Constitution Art. II, § 7 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); Code § 2.2-4000 et seq. (Administrative Process Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 1VAC30-11-10 et seq. (admin regs mandating federal standards); *Va. Dep't of Corr. v. Compton*, 47 Va. App. 202 (2005) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 2.2-4019 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 8.1A-103 (federal alignment).

Washington: Constitution Art. I, § 29 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); R.C.W. § 34.05.001 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. WAC 10-08-001 et seq. (admin regs requiring impartiality); *Yim v. City of Seattle*, 194 Wash. 2d 682 (2019) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 34.05.425 (admin rules referencing federal); UCC § 62A.1-103 (federal conformity).

West Virginia: Constitution Art. IV, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); W. Va. Code § 29A-1-1 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 105 CSR 1 et seq. (admin regs mandating neutrality); *State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger*, 199 W. Va. 12 (1996) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 29A-5-1 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 46-1-103 (federal references).

Wisconsin: Constitution Art. XIII, § 1 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); Wis. Stat. § 227.01 et seq. (Administrative Procedure and Review Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. Wis. Admin. Code ATCP § 1.01 et seq. (admin regs requiring federal standards); *State v. Cissell*, 127 Wis. 2d 205 (1985) (federal supremacy in admin); Rule 227.44 (admin rules tied to federal); UCC § 401.103 (federal alignment).

Wyoming: Constitution Art. VI, § 20 (oath to support U.S. Constitution, affirming supremacy); W.S. § 16-3-101 et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act incorporating federal due process); Reg. 002.044.1 § 1 et seq. (admin regs mandating impartiality); *Painter v. Abels*, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 2000) (federal supremacy in hearings); Rule 16-3-107 (admin hearing rules); UCC § 34.1-1-103 (federal references).

Generic Version: Application of Federal Supremacy to Any Matter and All Law (Practically Speaking What Does Compliance with Federal Supremacy Look Like?)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY

This instant Court and instant Matter, including all involved entities (federal agencies, states, state agencies, counties, county courts, and Domestic Relations Sections) and individuals (judges, officials, employees, and agents), are bound by:

- **Judicial and Official Oaths:** 28 U.S.C. § 453 (federal judicial oath to uphold the Constitution); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (federal employee oath); Pa. Const. art. VI, § 3 (or equivalent state provisions, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XX, § 3), requiring all public officers and employees to support, obey, and defend the U.S. Constitution, with federal law prevailing in conflicts.
- **Supremacy Clause:** U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supreme Law of the Land), mandating that federal law preempts conflicting state or local actions, as affirmed in historical precedents like *Ableman v. Booth*, 62 U.S. 506 (1859) (state officials personally bound by federal authority) and *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (states and agents cannot impede federal operations). States, by ratifying the Constitution or being admitted to the Union, accepted this clause as an inherent and perpetual condition of membership, binding them irrevocably to federal law (*Texas v. White*, 74 U.S. 700 (1869); *Coyle v. Smith*, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
- **Title IV-D State Plan Affirmation:** §454(18) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 654(18)); 45 C.F.R. § 302.60, requiring states to submit plans affirming administration "in accordance with... all applicable Federal Laws, regulations and other official issuances," with federal texts governing (e.g., Pennsylvania State Plan cover: "The official text of said laws, regulations, and official issuances govern and the State agency acknowledges its responsibility to adhere to them"); mandatory statewide operation under §454(1) and 45 C.F.R. § 302.10, binding political subdivisions and individuals.
- **Cooperative Agreement Affirmation of Federal Supremacy:** 45 C.F.R. § 302.34 (requiring written agreements specifying compliance with Title IV-D and federal regulations); §454(7), (20) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 654(7), (20)); e.g., Pennsylvania Cooperative Agreement Section 9: "All parties affirm that they shall comply with the requirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, implementing Federal regulations, and any other applicable Federal requirements and standards" (or equivalent local arrangements in other states, e.g., California's Plans of Cooperation).
- **SCOTUS Binding Precedent:** *Ramos v. Louisiana*, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (all lower courts and officials must obey Supreme Court judgments); *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing suits against officials for federal law violations, reinforcing personal accountability).

No exemptions exist for individuals or entities in Title IV-D administration, as oaths, contracts, and constitutional mandates ensure mandatory compliance at every level, with potential liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under color of law (qualified immunity notwithstanding for willful defiance).

In formal administrative adjudications, agencies must issue decisions with findings and conclusions on all material issues, requiring point-by-point responses to raised presumptions or risk reversal for arbitrary action (5 U.S.C. § 557). This binds both Article I and Article III courts under supremacy claims explicitly.

CHIEF REQUIREMENT OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY WHEN ABRIDING THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY

Federal Supremacy demands adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process requires fundamental fairness, comprising due notice, neutral arbitration, substantive and procedural due process, and equal protection under the law. To ensure these protections, judicial officials and administrative hearing officers must apply the Mathews balancing test in all proceedings.

The Mathews balancing test evaluates procedural safeguards by weighing (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures, and (3) the government's interest, including administrative burdens (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). When abridging fundamental liberties or substantive rights, strict scrutiny is required, demanding a compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored means, and the least restrictive alternative, while considering judicial efficiency to avoid unnecessary delays without compromising rights (*Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).

DELIBERATE FEDERAL SUPREMACY CIRCUMVENTION BY DEPRIVATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION FIRST FOLLOWED BY DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY AND PARENTAL LIBERTIES SECOND

Entities are bound by federal supremacy, yet operations in practice deviate from lawful standards. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). State courts and agencies must avoid violations by first ensuring Fourteenth Amendment rights to fundamental fairness, justice, due process, and equal protection, and then protecting fundamental liberty interests in property and other rights. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). The objective of non-compliant systems may include maximizing federal funding through burdensome orders, leading to deprivations of equal protection via targeted enforcement. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Such practices contravene the Constitution and may warrant scrutiny for systemic violations. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

These issues arise from acts of commission concealed as omissions. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Cooperative agreements, embedded in federal and state laws, regulations, and contracts, affirm federal supremacy. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34). Yet, state and federal entities universally disregard these affirmations unlawfully, arguing against federal applicability, which breaches contractual and constitutional duties. (UCC § 1-308; 28 U.S.C. § 453). This constitutes evidence of non-compliance. (18 U.S.C. § 2384).

Despite affirmed supremacy, agreements may incentivize outcomes inconsistent with federal mandates, lacking rewards for constitutional adherence. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307). Repeated systematic failures demonstrate bad faith intent. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

Thus, systems interact across proceedings to perpetuate non-compliance: civil actions prolong involvement, asymmetric orders enable extractions, and enforcement siphons resources. (U.S.

Const. amend. XIV; *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). This results in harm and requires remedial action. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Within this context, litigants identify omissions and irregularities in administration. (U.S. Const. amend. I; *Employment Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).

DELIBERATE FAILURE OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY

Courts, agencies, and agents routinely violate supremacy requirements in Title IVD matters. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). They deprive litigants of Fourteenth Amendment protections, including but not limited to:

- Neutral Arbitration (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
- Statutory Compliance (45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307).
- Due Notice (*Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
- Substantive and Procedural Due Process of Law (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
- Equal Protection (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

Despite extensive notice, indifference persists predictably resulting in intentional deprivation of rights and leading to irreparable harm. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). To combat potential wanton indifference of Federal Supremacy in the instant matter before the instant court the “DOs and DON'TS of Federal Supremacy” are presented below.

Declarant herein is a belligerent claimant and maintains whatever level of “sustained legal combat” is necessary to defend his inherent right to Federal Supremacy Protections (of Declarant) and Prohibitions (against the state) and will escalate any and all infractions to the maximum capability to discourage any and all state agents from attempting to diminish contractual, constitutional, and divine rights of declarant or unlawfully enact noncontractual, unconstitutional, or undivine prohibitions of law against him.

UNDER FEDERAL SUPREMACY LITIGANTS ARE DUE FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS (DOs)

Under supremacy, litigants are entitled to:

- Fundamental Fairness and Justice under the Fourteenth Amendment and incorporation doctrine. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
 - Neutral Arbitration (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
 - Statutory Compliance (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).
 - Due Notice (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
 - Meaningful Hearing at a Meaningful Time (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
 - Pre-Deprivation hearings (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
- Due Process of Law (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
 - Substantive Rights (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
 - Fundamental rights requiring protection under state powers. (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
 - Fundamental right to Justice (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
 - Acquire, Possess, and Protect Property (U.S. Const. amend. V).
 - Care, Custody, and Control Child (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000))
 - Procedural safeguards for substantive rights. (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
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 - Presumptions (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
 - State Interest (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
 - De minimis when applicable (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944))(Quilloin v Walcott).
 - Burden of Proof (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
 - Standard of Proof (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
 - Evidence Standards (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).
 - Strict Scrutiny (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
 - Narrowly tailored (Washington v. Glucksberg).
 - Compelling state interest (Washington v. Glucksberg).
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 - As Applied (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
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- Proceedings often lack these considerations, circumventing constitutions. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Such actions, especially undertaken in bad faith, may constitute high crimes. (18 U.S.C. § 2381; 18 U.S.C. § 2384). Administrative agencies must comply with federal supremacy, as bankruptcy courts cannot override FCC regulations; this extends to state admin bodies handling Title IV-D, where federal law trumps state procedural denials (FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003)).

UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT THE COURT IS BARRED FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, OVERREACH, & OMISSIONS (DON'T'S)

Supremacy requires adherence to entitlements. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits:

- Overbroad Actions (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
- Unconstitutional Conditions (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
- Takings Clause Violations (U.S. Const. amend. V).
- Excessive Fines or Forfeitures (U.S. Const. amend. V).
- Failure to Protect (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
- Retaliation for Exercising Constitutional Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
- Vague language in rules, laws, statutes, and regulations (Void for Vagueness) (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
- Deliberate Indifference (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
- Municipal Failure (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
- State Created Dangers (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
- Commerce Clause violations (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
- Denying access to courts (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
- Failure to disclose commercial presumptions (UCC § 1-308).
- Committing Crimes [Obstruction, Evidence Tampering, intentional clerical errors] (18 U.S.C. § 2384).

Non-compliant entities engage in these, exceeding authority while denying safeguards. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); U.S. Const. amend. XIV). This inverts supremacy obligations. (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). These are not mere errors; notified entities continue unchanged. (Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; 28 U.S.C. § 453).

Evidentiary Standards and Rebuttal requirements Under Federal Rules

This section outlines key Federal Rules that govern the introduction and rebuttal of presumptions in proceedings, ensuring that unsubstantiated claims are inadmissible and that failure to rebut presumptions allows them to stand as established facts. By applying these rules, the memorandum demands rigorous evidentiary compliance to uphold federal supremacy and prevent arbitrary deprivations. Courts must gatekeep evidence under Daubert standards, excluding unreliable rebuttals to supremacy presumptions and forcing valid, point-by-point challenges or default acceptance (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

FRE 301 on Rebuttal of Presumptions: Under FRE 301, presumptions in civil cases shift the burden of production to the opposing party, requiring them to introduce evidence rebutting the presumption. If unrebutted, the presumption stands as established fact, potentially leading to summary judgment or directed verdict. In this memorandum, raised presumptions (e.g., of parental fitness or constitutional compliance) must be addressed point by point; failure to do so allows them to stand as law of the case.

FRE 302 on State Law Presumptions in Federal Court: FRE 302 governs presumptions in civil cases where state law supplies the rule of decision (e.g., in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction), applying state law to determine the presumption's effect. Where state presumptions conflict with federal supremacy, federal law prevails, but un rebutted state-aligned presumptions (e.g., non-oppressive support orders) must be rebutted point by point or accepted, estopping later challenges.

FRE 602 Against Attorneys Citing Unfounded Claims as Hearsay: Attorneys lacking personal knowledge who cite unsupported assertions without sworn testimony or evidence violate FRE 602, which requires witnesses to testify only to matters within their personal knowledge. Such claims amount to inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801-807, lacking foundation and constituting mere speculation. In proceedings, these must be stricken as unreliable, preventing attorneys from advancing "spurious arguments" without proper evidentiary support.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) on Admission by Failure to Deny: Failure to deny allegations constitutes admission, estopping non-rebuttal of supremacy points (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6)). Defenses not raised in initial responses are also waived, estopping state actors from later contesting un rebutted supremacy arguments (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)). This compels immediate point-by-point rebuttal. Defenses not raised in initial responses are waived, estopping state actors from later contesting un rebutted supremacy arguments (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)). This compels immediate point-by-point rebuttal. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (No state shall impair obligations of contracts) for cooperative agreements; 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Title IV-D enforcement mechanisms); *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (states can't immunize §1983 violations); or Fed. R. Evid. 201 (judicial notice of facts requiring rebuttal).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgement: In summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to rebut presumptions or facts with specific evidence; failure to do so results in judgment as a matter of law for un rebutted claims, enforcing point-by-point rebuttal under federal supremacy (*Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is granted for un rebutted facts or presumptions, compelling opponents to respond point by point with evidence or forfeit; this reinforces that silence on supremacy arguments estops later defenses (*Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (habeas for due process in admin detention); *Murphy v. NCAA*, 584 U.S. 453 (2018) (anti-commandeering doctrine); or 42 U.S.C. § 659a (international child support enforcement under supremacy)). These emphasize enforcement against obstruction.

FAILURE BY OMISSION

Supremacy terms dictate order requirements but compliance is lacking and prior orders evidence wilful evasion; overlap is absent, indicating systemic non-compliance. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); U.S. Const. amend. XIV). This reflects coordinated deviation from constitutional adjudication. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 2381).

NOTE THE DEVIOS NATURE

Non-compliance deprives litigants of unrecognized rights. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Awareness of speech and religion is common, but supremacy entitlements require extensive study. (U.S. Const. amend. I; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Omissions are harder to detect than overt acts. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Without reviewing case law, violations remain obscured. (*Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).

WHAT JUDGES AND CARTEL MEMBERS SAY WHEN MENTIONING THE CRIMINALITY

Responses may include ad hominem labels like "sovereign citizen." Assertions of rights prompt characterizations as extremist, demands for evaluations, or frivolous claims. (42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Employment Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1). Contempt threats chill rights. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Complaints yield frequent self-exonerations or dismissals. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Oversight entities may be intertwined. (18 U.S.C. § 2384). The system appears compromised. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).

Even all this is Nested in the context of larger constitutional problems

Litigant issues are not isolated; they stem from layered constitutional deficiencies. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Unlawful experiences nest within broader problems. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Asymmetric treatment escalates via agreements. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 302.34). Enforcement maximizes funding unconstitutionally. (42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.; U.S. Const. amend. V). Proceedings drain resources, impeding defense. (*Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). Complaints encounter further layers. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The structure spans hierarchies and jurisdictions. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).

Structural infiltration shifts from adjudication to simulation, depriving rights ab initio. (18 U.S.C. § 2381; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Schemes self-protect; detection requires outsider expertise. (*Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).

Allegations of systemic violations are not frivolous but colorable under §1983 for patterns of conduct (*Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); judicial immunity bars damages but not injunctive relief against ongoing supremacy breaches (*Pulliam v. Allen*, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)), and qualified immunity fails for clearly established rights like due process (*Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).

ACTS OF COMMISSION DISGUISED AS COVERT ACTS OF OMISSION

Effectiveness lies in omissions over actions. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Protection of rights is neglected. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Intervention for rule breaches is absent. (Pa.R.C.P. 1018). Instead, processes favor certain parties. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

Historically, courts accommodated pro se filings liberally. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). Now, access is restricted. Progress requires mastery of law. (Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Networks extend to agencies and clerks, who impede access. (18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Billions in funds invite manipulation. (42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. § 2384). Protections via contracts and laws obscure scrutiny. (45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307).

Proceedings lack justice due to systemic issues. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Operations may involve improper handling of funds. (18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.). Complicity enables violations. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Treason and sedition implications arise. (18 U.S.C. § 2381). Funding drives the issues. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34).

Specific Version: Application of Federal Supremacy to Family Law and Title IV-D

CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY IN TITLE IVD MATTERS (please note a fair amount of overlap between general matters and family law matters and/or matters concerning Title IVD).

This instant Court and instant Matter, including all involved entities (federal agencies, states, state agencies, counties, county courts, and Domestic Relations Sections) and individuals (judges, officials, employees, and agents), are bound by:

- **Judicial and Official Oaths:** 28 U.S.C. § 453 (federal judicial oath to uphold the Constitution); 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (federal employee oath); Pa. Const. art. VI, § 3 (or equivalent state provisions, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XX, § 3), requiring all public officers and employees to support, obey, and defend the U.S. Constitution, with federal law prevailing in conflicts.
- **Supremacy Clause:** U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supreme Law of the Land), mandating that federal law preempts conflicting state or local actions, as affirmed in historical precedents like *Ableman v. Booth*, 62 U.S. 506 (1859) (state officials personally bound by federal authority) and *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (states and agents cannot impede federal operations). States, by ratifying the Constitution or being admitted to the Union, accepted this clause as an inherent and perpetual condition of membership, binding them irrevocably to federal law (*Texas v. White*, 74 U.S. 700 (1869); *Coyle v. Smith*, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
- **Title IV-D State Plan Affirmation:** §454(18) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 654(18)); 45 C.F.R. § 302.60, requiring states to submit plans affirming administration "in accordance with... all applicable Federal Laws, regulations and other official issuances," with federal texts governing (e.g., Pennsylvania State Plan cover: "The official text of said laws, regulations, and official issuances govern and the State agency acknowledges

its responsibility to adhere to them"); mandatory statewide operation under §454(1) and 45 C.F.R. § 302.10, binding political subdivisions and individuals.

- **Cooperative Agreement Affirmation of Federal Supremacy:** 45 C.F.R. § 302.34 (requiring written agreements specifying compliance with Title IV-D and federal regulations); §454(7), (20) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 654(7), (20)); e.g., Pennsylvania Cooperative Agreement Section 9: "All parties affirm that they shall comply with the requirements of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, implementing Federal regulations, and any other applicable Federal requirements and standards" (or equivalent local arrangements in other states, e.g., California's Plans of Cooperation).
- **SCOTUS Binding Precedent:** *Ramos v. Louisiana*, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.) (all lower courts and officials must obey Supreme Court judgments); *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing suits against officials for federal law violations, reinforcing personal accountability).

No exemptions exist for individuals or entities in Title IV-D administration, as oaths, contracts, and constitutional mandates ensure mandatory compliance at every level, with potential liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under color of law (qualified immunity notwithstanding for willful defiance).

Federal law preempts state family law actions that conflict with federal objectives, such as dividing federally protected benefits in divorce proceedings (*Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo*, 439 U.S. 572 (1979)). This underscores that Title IV-D enforcement cannot override federal protections for property or parental rights without strict scrutiny.

Federal law preempts state actions that undermine national objectives, even without express conflict, if they obstruct federal policy—as in Title IV-D where state family law practices frustrating federal supremacy are invalid (*Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)). This reinforces that state actors cannot evade federal mandates through procedural or incentive-based schemes.

CHIEF REQUIREMENT OF FEDERAL SUPREMACY WHEN ABRIDING THE RIGHT LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY

Federal Supremacy demands adherence to the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process requires fundamental fairness, comprising due notice, neutral arbitration, substantive and procedural due process, and equal protection under the law. To ensure these protections, judicial officials and administrative hearing officers must apply the *Mathews* balancing test in all proceedings.

The *Mathews* balancing test evaluates procedural safeguards by weighing (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures,

and (3) the government's interest, including administrative burdens (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). When abridging fundamental liberties or substantive rights, strict scrutiny is required, demanding a compelling governmental interest, narrowly tailored means, and the least restrictive alternative, while considering judicial efficiency to avoid unnecessary delays without compromising rights (*Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).

In family law and Title IV-D matters, Federal Supremacy mandates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, preventing deprivations of parental, religious, or property liberties without fundamental fairness, including due notice, neutral arbitration, substantive and procedural due process, and equal protection. Judicial and administrative officials must conduct the *Mathews* balancing test without exception to assess these elements.

For fit parents, abridgements of fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling state interest, narrowly tailored measures, and the least restrictive means; however, the state's interest is presumed *de minimis* (*Quilloin v. Walcott*, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)), making such abridgements legally nigh-impossible in routine cases, as administrative efficiency or funding incentives cannot override the presumption (*Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).

DELIBERATE FEDERAL SUPREMACY CIRCUMVENTION BY DEPRIVATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS, JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION FIRST FOLLOWED BY DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY AND PARENTAL LIBERTIES SECOND

Entities are bound by federal supremacy, yet operations may deviate from lawful standards. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). State courts and agencies must avoid violations by first ensuring Fourteenth Amendment rights to fundamental fairness, justice, due process, and equal protection, and then protecting fundamental liberty interests in property and other rights. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). The objective of non-compliant systems may include maximizing federal funding through burdensome orders, leading to deprivations of equal protection via targeted enforcement. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Such practices contravene the Constitution and may warrant scrutiny for systemic violations. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

These issues arise from acts of commission concealed as omissions. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Cooperative agreements, embedded in federal and state laws, regulations, and contracts, affirm federal supremacy. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34). Yet, entities may disregard these affirmations, arguing against federal applicability, which breaches contractual and constitutional duties. (UCC § 1-308; 28 U.S.C. § 453). This constitutes evidence of non-compliance. (18 U.S.C. § 2384).

Despite affirmed supremacy, agreements may incentivize outcomes inconsistent with federal mandates, lacking rewards for constitutional adherence. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 45 C.F.R. pts.

301-307). Repeated failures demonstrate intent. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

Thus, systems interact across proceedings to perpetuate non-compliance: civil actions prolong involvement, asymmetric orders enable extractions, and enforcement siphons resources. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). This results in harm and requires remedial action. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Within this context, litigants identify omissions and irregularities in administration. (U.S. Const. amend. I; *Employment Div. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).

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Supremacy requires adherence to entitlements. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits:

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FAILURE BY OMISSION

Supremacy terms absent from family orders, indicating institutional deviation. (*Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 18 U.S.C. § 2381).

NOTE THE DEVIOS NATURE

Deprivations exploit unawareness. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Omissions evade detection. (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).

PSYCHOPATHS WHO ENGAGE THE CARTEL

Mothers engaging a cartel inspired simulation of law for advantage may be complicit. (18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

WHAT JUDGES AND CARTEL MEMBERS SAY WHEN MENTIONING THE CRIMINALITY BY PRO SE LITIGANTS

Ad hominem responses like "sovereign citizen" occur. (Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Rights assertions lead to labels, evaluations, frivolous findings, and contempt threats. (Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Self-investigations exonerate. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 18 U.S.C. § 2384). System compromised. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).

Even all this is Nested in the context of larger constitutional problems

Family issues nest in layered deficiencies. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Asymmetric custody escalates support. (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 302.34). Orders maximize funding unconstitutionally. (42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.; U.S. Const. amend. V; 15 U.S.C. § 1673). Divorce drains defense. (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). Complaints meet resistance. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Structure spans. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).

Infiltration creates simulation, depriving rights. (18 U.S.C. § 2381; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). Detection needs expertise. (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).

ACTS OF COMMISSION DISGUISED AS COVERT ACTS OF OMISSION

The effectiveness of the alleged scheme lies in acts of commission that are deliberately masked as mere omissions. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Fundamental constitutional rights are systematically neglected, and no corrective intervention occurs when clear procedural rules are violated. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Pa.R.C.P. 1018). Court processes are structured to favor one side, creating a documented bias against fathers in family-law and Title IV-D matters. (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

Historically, courts liberally construed pro se filings to ensure access to justice, but that practice has been severely restricted in modern family-law proceedings. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). Today, meaningful relief requires extraordinary mastery of both substantive and procedural law. (Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Networks of judicial, agency, and clerical personnel actively impede access to the record and to hearings, effectively closing the courthouse doors to litigants who challenge the system. (18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 4301 et seq.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

The billions of dollars in federal Title IV-D incentive payments create powerful financial motives for abuse and manipulation. (42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. § 2384). Cooperative agreements and state plans, while ostensibly binding, obscure scrutiny through vague language and buried incentives. (45 C.F.R. pts. 301-307). In practice, family-law proceedings lack fundamental justice because the underlying operations involve the systematic mishandling and redirection of public funds. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 18 U.S.C. § 2384; 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et

seq.). This coordinated conduct constitutes complicity in an enterprise that deprives citizens of constitutional rights under color of law. (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The scale and persistence of these violations raise serious implications of treason and seditious conspiracy. (18 U.S.C. § 2381). At its root, the entire structure is driven by the financial incentives embedded in the Title IV-D program itself. (45 C.F.R. § 302.34).

Prayer for Relief

The Court or agency must apply federal supremacy, strict scrutiny (requiring demonstration of (1) a compelling governmental interest, (2) narrowly tailored means to achieve that interest, and (3) the least restrictive alternative available), and due process across proceedings, including evidentiary standards of clear and convincing evidence for deprivations of fundamental liberties such as parental rights or property interests, or rebut each point with authority. (*Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Rules of evidence and burden-shifting principles require point-by-point rebuttal; failure to do so allows presumptions to stand unchallenged, shifting the burden and estopping contrary arguments later under doctrines of acquiescence by silence, judicial estoppel, and arbitrary/capricious review. (*Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); 5 U.S.C. § 706; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). Non-compliance warrants recusal, appeal, records disclosure, or federal action under Section 1983 or removal. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1441; 5 U.S.C. § 552; 65 P.S. §§ 67.101 et seq.).

Federal courts may enjoin state proceedings to protect federal rights when necessary, excepting the Anti-Injunction Act for supremacy violations in family law or admin matters (28 U.S.C. § 2283). This allows intervention against non-compliant state actors. Federal courts must prioritize civil rights cases under §1983, expediting hearings on supremacy violations in family law to prevent irreparable harm from delayed rebuttals (28 U.S.C. § 1657). This enforces swift point-by-point responses. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over supremacy claims, allowing removal and forcing state actors to rebut or face federal adjudication (28 U.S.C. § 1331).

Conclusion

Adherence to federal supremacy and due process ensures equitable proceedings. Non-compliance erodes integrity. Immediate compliance is required. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). At its core, federal supremacy mandates the "DOs"—required protections such as neutral arbitration, statutory compliance, due notice, meaningful pre-deprivation hearings, substantive and procedural due process, equal protection, presumptions (e.g., of parental fitness), burdens and standards of proof, evidence standards, and strict scrutiny for fundamental liberties. (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). Conversely, it prohibits the "DON'Ts"—actions like overbroad measures, unconstitutional conditions, takings without due process, excessive fines, failure to protect,

retaliation for rights exercise, vagueness, deliberate indifference, municipal failures, state-created dangers, commerce clause violations, denying court access, failing to disclose presumptions, and committing obstruction or tampering. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV; U.S. Const. amend. V; 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

All government agents—state and federal judges in judicial or administrative capacity, administrative adjudicators with quasi-judicial roles, or any official in executive, legislative, or regulatory functions—must act lawfully under federal supremacy, as it binds every level of government without exception, preempting conflicting actions and requiring constitutional compliance in all capacities. (Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); 5 U.S.C. § 706).

In the spirit of full contact, armed legal combat,
With contractual, constitutional, and Divine Authority,

/A/ Blair, Agent

DISCLAIMER

*I am not an expert in the law however I do know right from wrong. If there is any man or woman damaged by any statements herein, if he will inform me by facts I will sincerely make every effort to amend my ways. I hereby and herein reserve the right to amend and make amendments to this document as necessary, in order that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. If the parties given notice by means of this document have information that would controvert and overcome this Affidavit, please advise me IN WRITTEN AFFIDAVIT FORM within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, **providing me with your counter affidavit**, proving with particularity by stating all requisite actual evidentiary fact and all requisite actual law, and not merely the ultimate facts or conclusions of law, that this Affidavit Statement is substantially and materially false sufficiently to change materially my status and factual declarations. Your silence stands as consent to, and tacit approval of, the declarations herein being established as fact of the matter of law. **Any statement made about any portion of this document being incorrect will necessarily indicate that you believe all remaining portions of the document to be true to the best of your knowledge.***

Pursuant to 28 USC Section 1746(1)

".. any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same, such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported, evidenced, establish, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form..

(1)If executed without the United States: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on (date).

(Signature)".

(2)If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on (date).

(Signature)".

VERIFICATION, DECLARATION, AND 28 USC 1746

I, blair of columbia // reich: blair-jesse-ellyn, being first duly sworn upon oat, state that I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing Complaint and know the contents thereof; that the same is true of my personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated upon information and believe, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Further I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct by me the man/Trustor/Settlor/Agent to and beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust / UCC 9 REGISTERED ORGANIZATION / SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP, LEGAL NULLITY, BLAIR JESSE ELLYN REICH, as herein designated.

2 /15/ 2026

Further I sayeth naught.

AUTOGRAPH

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT RECOURSE
Reserving ALL Natural God-Given, Constitutionally protected,
Unalienable Birthrights, Waiving None, Ever,
BY: blair of columbia // reich: blair-jesse-ellyn, free White
Pennsylvanian
For: BLAIR JESSE ELLYN REICH, legal nullity, *ens legis*

/A/ Blair, Agent

With a heavenly domicile,
Mail deliverable to:
% 227 Cherry Street, Columbia, Pennsylvania
blairjesseellynreich@gmail.com
979-574-1577

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

LANCASTER COUNTY

Autographed before me on _____ (date)

By: reich: blair-jesse-ellyn, man

Signature of notarial officer

Stamp

Title of Office

My Commission Expires: